stemmed (Gramsci, 10) . In seeking to incorporate these 'organic intellectuals', and particularly over the longer-term, it was essential for the ruling group to make important compromises and even required, in the words of Steve Jones, 'a truly hegemonic group or class' to 'make large parts of its subalterns' worldview its own'. 8 Such compromises, however, needed to be carefully managed:
Undoubtedly the fact of hegemony presupposes that account be taken of the interests and the tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised, and that a certain compromise equilibrium should be formed -in other words, that the leading group should make sacrifices of an economic-corporate kind. But there is also no doubt that such sacrifices and such a compromise cannot touch the essential… (Gramsci, 161) .
The essential referred to here was the nature of the state and, more specifically, the manner in which it protected the interests of the ruling classes. Such an outlook, perhaps unsurprisingly, made Gramsci very sceptical towards the nature of 'parliamentary democracy' as it had emerged since the nineteenth century. 9 In an analysis of the rise of 'laissez-faire liberalism', for example, he emphasised that it merely represented 'a fraction of the ruling class which wishes to modify not the structure of the State, but merely government policy'. Consequently, the best that could be hoped for in a parliamentary democracy was 'a rotation in governmental office of the ruling-class parties' as opposed to 'the foundation and organisation of a new political society, and even less of a new type of civil society' (Gramsci, 160) .
In trying to understand more fully the nature of power and its maintenance over the longerterm Gramsci moved away from the traditional Marxist analysis that placed power largely within the spectrum of controlling economic resources. He argued that the state needed to be thought of as 'a balance between political society and civil society' which allowed for 'the hegemony of one social group over the entire nation, exercised through so-called private organizations like the Church, trade unions, or schools'. 10 This highlights the fact that Gramsci viewed educational structures as having an important role to play in the establishment and maintenence of hegemonic power. In particular he identified an increased tendency towards 'vocational' schooling as a significant contributing factor, arguing that it created a model of education wherein such schools were reserved for the 'instrumental classes' whilst the 'classical' schools became the preserve of the 'dominant classes and the intellectuals' (Gramsci, 26) . The consequence was to 'perpetuate traditional social differences' by ensuring that the 'instrumental classes' continued to view their role in the democratic sphere as being inherently limited by the false promises of social mobility that laissez-faire liberalism guaranteed. Yet, despite this sense of ingrained educational division between 'the dominant classes' and the 'instrumental classes', Gramsci's wider contribution to the understanding of power dynamics, importantly, allows for a measure of fluidity thanks largely to his concept of the 'organic intellectual'. This is perhaps missing in the writings of other analysts such as Pierre Bourdieu, for example, whose concept of habitus does not necessarily sit easily alongside the realities of significant social mobility and educational achievement by those within the working-classes, particularly as reforms are introduced in order to reduce the potential for radicalism. 11 The reality of such mobility is of particular relevance to this paper given the nature of social and educational transformation that we witness within sections of the Catholic population in Ireland during the nineteenth century and in Northern Ireland between the 1950s and 1990s.
Hegemony and the politics of reform
Gramsci's formulation of hegemony, and in particular the processes in its maintenance, can be identified within British and Irish society in the aftermath of the political Union of 1800/01 as demands for political reform intensified and as the political establishment sought to protect its position of power. 12 This was, after all, a period of continued and considerable, social, political and economic change due largely to sustained industrial development, the growth of urbanisation and the rapidly rising population. 13 Most of this change was presented in a positive light, supporting as it did, Britain's rising imperial aspirations that now stretched to all corners of the globe; Britain, despite the obvious setback of losing the American colonies, was the global superpower. Nevertheless, the changes of the period also presented considerable challenges for those in power -both political and religious. 14 The rising population, along with the growth of urban, working-class living, led to increased levels of crime and fears that a social breakdown was in the offing. Leading the way in the fight against these 'immoral' lifestyles, in the first instance, were the churches who felt particularly threatened within industrial society. 15 During the latter years of the eighteenth century, and continuing into the nineteenth, they made a significant effort to develop an educational model capable of giving the 'children of the poor' a better understanding of the 'doctrines of the Bible'. 16 To facilitate this there was a growth of educating agencies across England, such as the Sunday School Society and 'The National Society for Promoting the Education of the Poor in the Principles of the Established Church', which aimed to deliver a basic education to the working classes but which also helped to place education on the political agenda. This was evident in the efforts made in 1807 to introduce a Parochial Schools system that would provide for two years of 'free schooling for all poor children between seven and fourteen years of age, in reading, writing, and arithmetic, and for girls, in addition, needlework, knitting, etc.'. 17 The proposal proved unpopular however, particularly within more conservative circles, with one prominent fear centring on the impact it could potentially have upon wider British society. One parliamentarian, Mr Davies Giddy, famously outlined his opposition on the basis that it could lead to the working classes despising:
…their lot in life, instead of making them good servants in agriculture, and other laborious employments to which their rank in society had destined them; instead of teaching them subordination, it would render them factious and refractory…it would enable them to read seditious pamphlets, vicious books, and publications against Christianity; it would render them insolent to their superiors...
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Whilst popular education may have been capable of delivering some social benefits its provision needed to be carefully managed to ensure that it did not upset the political establishment.
19
This emphasis on carefully managing change was to become a characteristic of British politics throughout the nineteenth century as the governing classes sought to lessen the threat of upheaval in the half-century following the French Revolution. 20 Importantly, whilst measures such as the 1832 Reform Act can be seen as helping to stave off the potential for wider turmoil, they also required a degree of political compromise to be reached between the established political order and those seeking greater reform and representation within both the middle and working classes. 21 This willingness of political leaders to implement what were deemed dramatic and far-reaching reforms during the nineteenth century should be viewed as the outworking of a new hegemony within Britain that saw the political establishment protected, but increased, with the middle/lower classes becoming increasingly incorporated into a uniquely British capitalist society by their own choice (Gramsci, (160) (161) . 22 This is reinforced by the fact that those politicians pursuing reform often did so, less because of political idealism and more from a fear of the repercussions of not taking action. 23 represented nothing more than a 'compromise system' between the two opposing camps that had emerged on the issue over the century -one group who wished to defend the status-quo and a second who believed that carefully managed change was necessary in order to protect the established order against the growing radicalism of the period. 29 Such was the extent of this compromise, however, it failed to address the principle concerns of those calling for meaningful reform in that it 'provided neither free nor compulsory education at elementary level' (Green, 302) . This hesitancy at implementing change was further evidenced, he argues, in the 1902 Balfour Act which 'created the first state secondary schools' but only in a manner that 'deliberately preempted the objectives of the working-class in secondary education' by ensuring that 'new state grammar schools were kept deliberately separate from elementary schooling to discourage any notion that the majority of children could transfer into secondary education' (Green, 306) . The divisions within the system were also augmented by the 'limited number of scholarships provided for secondary schools' which, he argues, 'meant that the exclusion of the working class from secondary education was still almost total'.
Pointing out that the average child 'still left school at 13', Green maintains that the 'independent secondary schools remained more elitist than any of their overseas counterparts, reflecting an obsession with caste exclusiveness' (Green, 306) . This, of course, largely reflects the observations of Gramsci in his analysis of the separate 'vocational' and 'classical' systems with their obvious class distinctions.
The political dynamics described here are crucial to understanding the nature of the political conflict surrounding the education debate in Ireland since the nineteenth century. As
Green has highlighted, change within the educational system in England and Wales came slow, largely through an unwillingness to interfere in church control of education, but also a strongly held belief that the state should not become too deeply involved in such provision. 30 Yet, despite such scruples for England and Wales and strong opposition from the Irish Established Church, successive British governments decided to adopt a very different approach in Ireland. 31 Rather, it was decided to pursue a policy of reform in order to generate greater stability and to encourage Catholic Ireland into the political Union. 32 This reflected a growing belief in Westminster that if the Union was to succeed, and symbolically for the growing British Empire success was essential, it was becoming ever more important to bring Catholic Ireland in from the political wilderness. 33 Such a realism was certainly to be found in the conversion of Sir Robert Peel, the then Home Secretary, to the policy of Catholic emancipation during the mid-1820s -a policy he had fundamentally opposed earlier in the decade on largely religious grounds. His change of heart was based on 'the constitutional view of the dangers which might arise from refusing as compared with those which might be apprehended from granting concession'. about the importance of dealing with the issue properly as it was a 'matter of overwhelming political importance'. Moreover, he warned that 'in looking at Ireland with reference to a question of this nature, or indeed with reference to any matter whatever, he could not regard it in any point of view as separate from the empire at large'. 36 The efforts to secure 'governmentality' however, must also be seen within the framework of a new hegemonic order being created on the island. One outcome of the expanded educational provision, after all, was the further enhancement of the Catholic middle classes as a more concerted effort was made to find a better balance between the British political society and Irish civil society.
This was a move greatly opposed by the existing Ascendancy class who were growing increasingly worried about their status within this new order.
Conflicting Hegemonies: Ascendancy Interests against Westminster Reforms
At a 'Great Protestant Meeting', held at the Mansion House in Dublin in January 1832 to oppose the creation of the Board of Education, the Earl of Roden declared the determination of those present to 'uphold the Protestant constitution of this country' and 'maintain the Protestant state which we have received from our ancestors, and which it is our duty to hand down to our children.' 37 He was keen to highlight the symbolism of changes that had taken place over the previous number of years; reforms that provided evidence of how 'the Protestant interests of this country were no longer esteemed worthy of consideration'. Listing a series of recent measures, including the 1829 Catholic Relief Bill, he argued that 'Protestant property, Protestant life, and Protestant character' was very much 'at stake' and, that this had been further reinforced by the new system of education, described as 'the most infamous series of insults that could be put upon the Protestants of Ireland'.
For many Irish Protestants the compromises enshrined within the educational reforms ran contrary to Protestantism and, more specifically, the Protestant constitution that they had hoped would be extended to Ireland in a more efficacious manner with the Union. 38 For large sections of that community, indeed, the Union and Britishness equated to Protestantism and to deviate from promoting the latter was to undermine the former. 39 As such, the priority ought to have been taking measures that would eventually weaken the Catholic Church and allow ordinary Irish Catholics to see the error of their ways. The new national schools system, however, was seen to place the Catholic Church on a more equal footing and actually served to undermine the opportunities for converting. 40 The new model, with its desire to provide 'a system of education, from which would be banished even the suspicion of proselytism' 41 was seen to directly contravene the key objective of educational provision in Ireland, which, according to the Belfast Newsletter, was 'to educate the R. Catholics':
Our object in doing so, and we freely own it, would be their conversion, and we believe that if they were generally educated this is a result that would naturally
The long-term consequences of the new policy were deemed great, therefore, as can be seen from a public address to the leading Presbyterian Dr Henry Cooke, written by an anonymous 'Layman' of the Established Church, who argued that the educational system had for its 'design and object the preservation of Romanism in Ireland, and the training up the present and coming generations of our country in the destructive errors of that idolatrous superstition.' Insisting that 'Popery must fall' he argued that it was 'the duty of every Protestant to strive…to accelerate its approach'. He maintained, however, that for as long as the 'present National System of Education remains, Ireland, humanly speaking, must remain bound in darkness and idolatry. Popery is supported and built up by it at every point.' 43 By the 1830s there was a growing concern that the political and religious establishment in
Ireland was under severe threat from a Westminster (and Whig) government determined, not only to placate Irish Catholicism, but to give it a more positive role within the Union and Empire. 44 Importantly, the concept of 'popular education' was now seen to be a key component of these efforts and, as such, was quickly losing its potential as a proselytising tool and becoming a vital weapon in the armament of the reforming radicals and, of course, the 'papists'. In the face of this perceived threat there emerged a growing belief that Irish Protestants needed to stand up for themselves more effectively if they were to fully protect their religious, political and economic interests on the island. As such, we see significant efforts to develop ties with like-minded individuals and organisations in Britain who, as outlined above, feared for their own status amid the wider reforms of the period. In particular we see close ties being developed with the 'National Club', a Gentleman's society formed by
MPs and Lords in London to "defend the Protestant principles of the constitution", and which launched a nationwide campaign in support of their Irish counterparts. Like the Ascendancy class in Ireland the Club rallied against the new educational arrangements which they claimed, in a series of "Addresses" to the "Protestants of the Empire" published in The
Standard, treated Irish Protestants unfairly by preventing 'unrestricted access to the Holy Scriptures' -a policy, they argued, that was 'the essence of Romanism'. 45 The Committee of the Club put forward an impassioned plea for the government to 'cease to encourage the Popish creed' but rather to 'foster the Protestant faith' and argued that it was only through such a course of action that real peace would be achieved in Ireland and, ultimately, 'security for England'. The present time is peculiarly productive of schemes for the formation of political associations. Of these, the majority are highly deserving of the approbation of all good men. The Evangelical Alliance -for religion and politics are now so blended in every public question that we must include this admirable society in the number -has in view the highest objects which can affect the temporal interests of the Christian Church. The Protestant Alliance is a justifiable and necessary association for the defence of the religion of the Reformation and the politics of the Revolution. The same may be said of the National Club. In each of these societies, there is no more exclusive or contracted platform than such as has been rendered to a certain degree limited, by the necessity for the exclusion of the enemies of the religion of the State and the integrity of the Empire.
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Although this places an important emphasis on the growing sectarian divisions of Ireland there was also a further significant aspect to the development of these new ties with Conservative opinion in England. All of the societies were committed to the protection of a Pounden insisted that the changes proposed 'would be a most serious thing for their country'.
Arguing that the reforms witnessed over the century had gone far enough, he maintained that 'it was the wealth and intelligence of the country that should form the great element in the voice that should send representatives to Parliament'.
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The views expressed at these demonstrations, and the support obtained from large sections of the population that stood to gain from the reforms, demonstrate the extent to which an Ascendancy hegemony had successfully been established. This was, however, a hegemony characterised by domination, and maintained through the social, economic and religious fears of the community rather than through Gramsci's 'transformism'. crisis of the period which should, in turn, be seen as part of a much bigger battle for political power in Britain -a battle that had class interests at its heart. 67 We get a sense of this from a speech delivered at a 'meeting of Liverpool business men in the Exchange Hotel Banqueting
Hall' in October 1909, when Carson declared his belief that Lloyd George's budget had been 'rushed, not for business purposes, but for election purposes' and he condemned the Liberals for having used the popular proposals 'for the purpose of appealing to ignorance and class prejudice'. 68 Carson seems to have held the same concerns about 'popular politics' that Balfour had and he appears, on face value at least, to have been very uneasy about the type of politics being advanced by the Liberals which continued to give precedence to the voice of the masses over the educated and wealthy of society. For Carson, this wider political crisis of the period required "British pluck", "British statesmanship" and "British honesty" to rise to the fore and 'every weapon available in constitutional conflict' to be employed in order to fight back against the dangerous radicalism of the Liberals. 69 Yet, what is also important here is that, despite his apparent opposition towards the Liberal Party 'appealing to ignorance and class prejudice' he was to have no such qualms about employing similar techniques when it came to rousing working class support against Home Rule in Belfast from 1911. 70 A fundamental difference between the two was the nature of influence that had been brought to bear on the loyalist working classes and which was later cemented through the militant structures of the Ulster Volunteer Force. Whilst one commentator has described unionism as having become 'democratised' throughout the 1905-1921 period it could be argued that, in many ways, the exact opposite had occurred. 71 Whilst the loyalist working classes were certainly pivotal to the anti-Home Rule cause this was very much based upon a strictly conservative agenda wherein loyalist leaders tolerated no dissenting voices from within. This is reflected in the observations of one commentator, in 1913, who opined that:
The occasion has been seized to strengthen the conservatism of Ulster -I do not use the word in a party sense. By disciplining the Ulster democracy and by teaching it to look up to them as its natural leaders the clergy and the gentry of the province are providing against the spread of revolutionary doctrine and free Education and the loyalist working-class -'Siege Mentality' hegemony …I am still of the opinion that her answer will disclose, as I have claimed for many years past, that we occupy the lowest place in the British Commonwealth of Nations in regard to the proportion of our school population in receipt of higher education.
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The continued predominance of a conservative ideology at the heart of the Northern Ireland government had a considerable impact upon educational policy as it evolved after 1921.
Whilst there was at least some commitment to extending educational opportunities -certainly with the aspiration of aiding industrial growth -this was very much limited in terms of who should be the beneficiaries. As the above quote from Harry Midgley (one of a few Labour minded unionists to emerge during the inter-war years) suggests, progression through the various academic levels remained limited and largely confined to an elite few. Midgley emphasised this further, indeed, when he declared his belief that education was 'the prerogative of those with the big bank balances, and that, too often, many poor children are deprived of a full education simply through the poverty of their parents.'
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The Stormont debate to which Midgley was contributing was exploring the potential for educational reform that would keep Northern Ireland in line with reforms being proposed for England and Wales. 77 These reforms stemmed from an increasingly popular view that 'secondary education should be no longer regarded as the privilege of a small elite but as the prerogative of all' 78 and the growing belief that this required a new system capable of delivering a 'common code of regulations for all schools catering for children over the age of 11'. 79 The 1944 'Butler Act' was, initially at least, viewed as the outcome of such aspirations through its provision of free secondary education for all young people up to the age fifteen and, in particular, its 'abolition of fee paying in grammar schools'. 80 As Watson has argued, the hope was that the new model of education would ensure a new equality of opportunity for all young people, irrespective of their social class, and enable the 'previously under-utilized talents of the intelligent working class…to flourish, reaping economic as well as cultural benefits'. 81 Many contemporary commentators now question the impact that these reforms had in producing the desired 'meritocracy' and claim that they merely advanced the educational ambitions of the middle classes with only a 'very select few' from the working classes benefiting from a grammar school education. 82 This has led Todd to conclude that:
…selective secondary education ensured that there were very few golden tickets to go round, and most of them went to the children of privileged parents. Many manual workers had high hopes that their children's opportunities would be greater, and did all that they could to make this possible. But the post-war economy required thousands of assembly-line workers and thousands more to undertake routine clerical work; and successive governments ensured that the education system was tailored to provide them. 83 Whilst the inequalities of the system are of huge importance, so too is the existence of the 'very few golden tickets'. The symbolism of the perceived opportunities presented by the new educational system, however small they were in reality, became an important cog in the outworking of hegemony in the mid-twentieth century. A new narrative emerged from the reforms that those with the necessary talents and determination would achieve academically, irrespective of their social class origins. 84 The tripartite system, determined by the 'scientifically based' 11+ examination, would, it was argued, ensure that children ended up in the educational establishment that best suited their abilities -a characteristic previously identified by Gramsci in his analysis of the vocational/classical schools model. 85 Despite the fact that the scientific basis of the system was quickly challenged 86 the reforms did help to reinforce the idea that 'academic' education was for some and not others. 87 This was further strengthened by the changing nature of the British economy in the years following which seen a rise in the number of people employed in 'white collar work', an increase in general living standards and the perceived 'embourgeoisement of the affluent worker'. 88 All of this helped to bring about a new period of Gramsci's 'transformism' that seen increased numbers of young people leave school with qualifications, the middle classes significantly increased and the political elite relatively unscathed. Most people feel that little can really be achieved politically in the existing political stalemate. There exists in the North at the moment a greater wealth of talent -young business men, professional men and graduates -than ever before and there is a growing desire among them to get together to pool these talents and to tackle community problems. 96 The Civil Rights movement in Northern Ireland reflected this collective determination and served to greatly enhance social capital within the Catholic community which had already been building since the 1950s. 97 Moreover, the proroguing of Stormont in 1972 and the implementation of Direct Rule from Westminster, put in place a new political establishment that recognised the need for social and economic reform that might bring longer-term stability despite the violence of the period. There was, in other words, a new effort towards 'transformism' on the part of Westminster that had been clearly problematic for the Stormont administration.
This enhanced social capital, and the subsequent benefits accrued from that, was lacking within Protestant working class communities. There was no equivalent emphasis placed on educational achievement either at community or political level, despite the on-going decline of the 'traditional industries'. 98 This has contributed to a significant long-term undervaluing of educational achievement as highlighted by one school principal that serves a Protestant working-class community:
To me, the main reason why the children underachieve is the complete lack of aspirations. And that is lack of aspirations from the child is borne right up through…our parents absolutely adore their children…but there is just a lack of value of education.
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This lack of ambition was reflected in the small numbers of young people even attempting the 11+ examination. These views were supported by a teacher in the school who drew comparisons with working class Catholic schools:
About ten years ago a similar community in a Catholic area, they had the tradition that the only way they could get out was through education. So those children were pushed and pushed and pushed and pushed; so children from an area like this would have went through Queen's [University] and would now be teachers, solicitors, you know?
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In a similar vein, the principal emphasised the role played by the sense of community within Catholic areas as being important and felt this was not as evident in Unionist areas.
The legacy of this lack of educational ambition described here is evident in statistics from the Department of Education's annual 'School Leavers Survey' in relation to students entitled to free school meals which continues to show Protestant, working-class children underperform.
The 2013 release highlighted that:
19.7% (116) of Protestant boys entitled to free school meals achieve at least five GCSEs at grades A*-C or equivalent including GCSE English and maths compared with 33.2% (415) of Catholic boys entitled to free school meals.
Catholic girls entitled to free school meals (43.8%, 557) The principal went on to describe a visit to Stormont, with community representatives, to see
Sinn Féin about these ongoing efforts to expand their provision and expressed the opinion that 'there is no point talking to the Unionists…because they don't push anything'.
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When asked to explain the reluctance of Unionist leaders to tackle the educational problems the principal was unwilling to express an opinion but one narrative that has emerged since the outbreak of violence in the late 1960s is that it stems from a fear that it would lead to a challenge of the political and social ascendancy that has characterised Unionism. 104 Further reflecting the views of Ervine, this representative also seen the relationship between the Unionist parties and working class loyalists as one of exploitation. When questioned on why 'Unionism' didn't want loyalists educated, he stated his belief that:
It gave them control. All we were was…[pause] right, you know, let them eat cake, sort of attitude. You know?...So many worked in the shipyard,
[paraphrasing Unionist leaders] "there's plenty for them to be doing anyway, we don't need them; we've got all the education and all the people we need in the higher echelons, we don't need these other people". There was no connection with the grassroots. That has got worse over the years.
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Although there is some evidence to suggest that the issue of eduational underachievement is now on the radar of parties such as the DUP and UUP, particularly following the publication of the Dawn Purvis' report, 108 this has not resulted in any substantive policy proposals.
Moreover, for some, their unwillingness to engage in a meaningful debate concerning the legacy of academic selection is further evidence of a lack of commitment to addressing the underachievement issue. argues that there is a need for debate on the current educational system. The PUP campaigns for academic selection at fourteen (rather than eleven) and for Grammar School intake to be 'capped as a way of providing a more socially balanced intake to the non-selective schools'. 110 Such proposals very much set them apart from mainstream Unionist parties who continue to unequivocally support academic selection and the Grammar school sector. This stance, it has been suggested, is merely a reflection of the social hierarchy model upon which unionism has historically been built wherein there are those to rule and those to be ruled.
Conclusion
The concept of popular education has long been a complex issue for those advocating political continuity and stability. Although vital to industrial interests there has always been a fear that it could contribute to the lower orders challenging the political establishment. This has been very much evident in Ireland where the minority Protestant Ascendancy class feared the repercussions that 'National education' would have on their status. Traditionally, the focus has tended to be on how such a policy would impact relations between Catholic and Protestant but this paper has highlighted a further significant legacy of this debate -the negative impact that it has had on the Protestant working classes. Applying Gramsci's concept of hegemony, the paper has argued that the Protestant Ascendancy has used the religious and sectarian divisions to shore up its political base and to advance a conservative form of politics that espoused a 'natural' social order. In so doing they successfully created a cultural outlook based around the principal that education was for some and not for others.
The effects of this are manifested most clearly in the high levels of educational underachievement evident within loyalist working class communities and particularly amongst young men. If the issue is to be addressed more effectively in the years ahead there needs to be a greater determination on the part of Unionist leaders to bring about change and this can only happen when they come to recognise the role played by the Unionist hegemony in helping to create this significant cultural deficit.
